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This research is composed of two essays, both using economic approaches to 
evaluate land conservation in the United States. Essay I uses econometric methods to 
evaluate public lands, and Essay II uses New Institutional Economics to gain insight into 
private land conservation. 
Essay I is titled "The Relationship Between Public Conservation Lands and 
Tourism Employment in the United States." This research examines the relationship 
between public conservation lands and the importance of tourism in United States 
counties. A spatial error model is used on three categories of conservation land: general 
public land, recreational land, and wilderness areas. A positive, significant relationship 
was shown between all three categories of conservation lands and the proportion of 
county employment in tourism. This research suggests that land conservation and 
economic development are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and that a stronger 
relationship between the tourism industry and conservation groups might be beneficial. 
Essay II is titled, "Institutional Analysis Applied to United States Private Land 
Conservation." United States land conservation, once dominated by government 
agencies, is increasingly performed by land trusts and other private conservation groups. 
This activity often takes the form of a land trusts collaborating with private landowners in 
enacting conservation easements. The rapid growth in private land conservation can be 
explained in part with insights from institutional analysis. One branch of institutional 
analysis looks at how institutions, or the 'rules of the game', influence how organizations 
form and in turn push for institutional change. This can be used to explain how United 
States tax laws and conservation easement enabling statutes interacted with land trusts 
and other conservation organizations to enable the rapid growth of private land 
conservation. This research contains insights into organizational and institutional issues 
that may be useful to ecosystem managers and conservation planners. 
A multidisciplinary approach is increasingly emphasized as necessary to the 
future of ecosystem and biodiversity conservation. This research contributes insights 
from economics that can be used in this multidisciplinary effort. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic theories and applications are gaining ground in government land 
management agencies, conservation biology research, and conservation organizations. 
There is increasing awareness of concepts such as the opportunity cost of conservation 
(Polasky and Vossler, 2006; Shogren et al., 1999), the market failures challenging the 
provision of conservation land (Asafu-adjaye, 2003; Albers and Ando, 2003), the 
institutional issues involved in ecosystem management (Imperial, 1999; Grumbine, 
1997), and economic benefits associated with direct, sustainable uses of natural 
ecosystems (Pearce and Moran, 1994; Jenkins et al., 2004). Among those scientists and 
practitioners striving to conserve the world's biodiversity and ecosystem sustainability, 
the knowledge that various human economic activities are the greatest threats to these 
systems is widespread and accepted (Czech et al., 2000). As such, economic research 
cannot be excluded from the table, and indeed is being embraced in new concepts such as 
"adaptive management", "ecosystem management" and "co-management" of natural 
resources (Keough and Blahna, 2006; Imperial, 1999; Grumbine, 1997, among others). 
Economics is evolving from being seen as "the problem" to part of the solution, and 
multi-disciplinary research is shaping the future of ecosystem management and 
biodiversity conservation. This study contributes to the application of economic analysis 
in land protection in two ways. 
Essay I employs econometric analysis to reveal a relationship between a direct use 
of public conservation lands by tourists, and its impact on the local economy. Essay II 
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employs institutional economic analysis to assist in explaining the rapidly growing 
private conservation movement. 
Essay I is titled "The Relationship between Public Conservation Land and 
Tourism Employment in the United States." This research looks at public lands in the 
United States, and a direct economic activity—tourism—that can be associated with these 
lands. Many of the benefits of conservation lands are public goods—with their infeasible 
exclusion and non-rival use. Difficulties of market provision of public goods have led to 
a system of government provision of conservation lands in the United States. However, 
federal government funding for land conservation has stagnated in recent years (Jenkins 
et al., 2004). The widespread data availability on public lands at the federal, state and 
local levels make it possible to analyze economic benefits from these lands using 
statistical methods. This research examines the relationship between tourism 
employment and public conservation lands and in United States counties. A spatial error 
model is used on three categories of conservation land: general public land, recreational 
land, and wilderness areas. A positive, significant relationship is shown between the 
proportion of employees in tourism and all three categories of conservation lands. This 
research suggests land conservation and economic development are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and a stronger relationship between the tourism industry and 
conservation groups might be beneficial. 
Essay II is titled "Institutional Analysis Applied to Private Land Conservation in 
the United States". Much of the world's biodiversity and intact ecosystems exist on 
privately owned land (Merenlender et al., 2004). Many conservation scientists and land 
managers are recognizing the need to include private lands in concert with public 
2 
reserves in conservation planning (Jenkins et al., 2004). There has been a surge in private 
land conservation in the United States beginning in the 1970s and continuing today (Land 
Trust Alliance, 2005) that challenges old notions that only the government can protect 
landscapes. This activity often takes the form of land trusts collaborating with private 
landowners in enacting conservation easements. The rapid growth in private land 
conservation can be explained in part with insights from the new institutional economics. 
A branch of new institutional economics looks at how institutions, or the 'rules of the 
game', influence how organizations form and in turn push for institutional change. This 
can be used to explain how United States tax laws and conservation easement enabling 
statutes interacted with land trusts and other conservation organizations to enable the 
rapid growth of private land conservation. 
The order of the two essays reflects the evolution of land conservation in the 
United States from public to private—first the impact of public lands on the economy is 
considered, then an analysis of the factors influencing the new wave of private 
conservation is performed. Today, conservation planners and ecosystem managers are 
increasingly looking across organizational boundaries, embracing interdisciplinary 
research, and including public and private lands in eco-system based plans (Grumbine, 
1997; Keough and Blahna, 2006; Imperial, 1999). This research hopes to add to the 
knowledge that helps conservation practitioners better integrate economics and ecology 
in designing plans that will be effective in meeting conservation goals as well as fostering 
broader based support and contributing to society's economic goals. 
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Chapter 2 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC CONSERVATION LANDS AND 
TOURISM EMPLOYMENT IN UNITED STATES COUNTIES 
Introduction 
Human-caused destruction of biodiversity worldwide is one of the major 
environmental problems of our time (Asafu-adjaye, 2003; Wilson, 1992; Pearce and 
Moran, 1994). Unlike some environmental problems, biodiversity loss is irreversible. 
Once a species is lost, it cannot be brought back by technology or an increased public 
awareness (Asafu-Adjaye, 2003). The crisis of extinctions, as many have called it, is an 
urgent global problem. 
Most of the animals and plants endangered today are at risk due to human causes 
(Wilcove et al., 1998). Habitat loss is the single greatest threat to biodiversity (Wilcove 
et al., 1998; Czech et al., 2000; Wilson, 1992). Conversion of natural ecosystems for 
human economic uses such as urbanization, agriculture, road construction, and energy 
extraction alter or destroy the habitats of many species (Czech et al., 2000; Wilcove et al., 
1998). As human populations and economies grow, the conversion of ecosystems 
accelerates and biodiversity declines (Asafu-Adjaye, 2003). 
Calls for more land protection are widespread among conservation biologists and 
other scientists studying biodiversity loss. Soule and Sanjayan (1998) state that the target 
of 10 percent of global land protection set by many conservation organizations is 
inadequate to stem the loss of biodiversity. They emphasize the need for formal 
protection of ecosystems, particularly in areas with high economic value, to ensure 
biodiversity will be maintained. Research by Asafu-Adjaye (2003) of 100 countries 
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shows a positive relationship between the percentage of protected land area and 
biodiversity levels. Protected areas as the percentage of total land area has been 
identified as an indicator of biodiversity (MacGillivray, 1993). Conserving habitat is 
central to conserving biodiversity, and land-use decisions are of critical importance to 
biodiversity conservation (Polasky and Vossler, 2006). 
Land protection can often be controversial, as many fear that taking land out of 
certain economic uses will lead to local economic decline (Duffy-Deno, 2000). 
Accounting for the economic impact of biodiversity conservation projects are critical to 
their success (Czech et al., 2000). On the flip side, if economic values of biodiversity are 
not accounted for in decision making, socially optimal land-use decisions may not be 
reached, and biodiversity will be inadequately protected (Pearce and Moran, 1994). 
Tourism has been identified as a direct use of biodiversity that can support its 
conservation (Pearce and Moran, 1994). This study looks at tourism and how its 
importance in the local economy may be enhanced by public land protection. 
Land Protection and Local Economies 
There is a general perception that land conservation comes at an economic cost, 
and that communities must choose between jobs and the environment. Regions that 
depend on natural resources extraction for their economies are concerned that excluding 
lands from these activities will result in widespread job loss, out-migration, and economic 
decline (Power, 1996). 
Recent research has examined these concerns and uncovered empirical evidence 
demonstrating conservation lands do not necessarily result in economic decline, and 
sometimes lead to economic growth in a region (Kerkvliet et al., forthcoming; Lewis et 
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al., 2002; Duffy-Deno, 1998). Duffy-Deno (1998) shows wilderness designation on 
federal lands formerly open for resource extraction had no effect on population density or 
employment growth in the intermountain Western United States. These results held true 
for even the areas most dependent on resource extraction. Lewis et al. (2002) examine 
the United States' Northern Forest region and the impact of public conservation land on 
net migration and employment growth. They found lands designated for preservation had 
no effect, while multiple-use conservation lands had a direct positive association with net 
migration and an indirect positive association with employment growth. Kerkvliet et al. 
(forthcoming) find that the Northwest Forest Plan, which closes off much of the federal 
lands in the Pacific Northwest United States to logging to protect the endangered 
Northern Spotted Owl, had a positive correlation with net migration and employment. 
Kerkvliet et al. (forthcoming) and Lewis et al. (2002) speculate that the positive 
association of conservation with net migration is due to the role of conservation land as a 
natural amenity. Natural amenities are environmental features that may attract people to 
recreate, retire or relocate to an area. Examples are a pleasant climate, varied 
topography, forests and water area. Natural amenities are the subject of a vast body of 
recent literature, and are shown to have positive associations with population and 
employment growth in rural areas (McGranahan, 1999; English et al., 2000). Firms 
may relocate to amenity-rich areas to take advantage of the influx of often well-educated 
migrants (Kwang-Koo et al., 2005). Deller et al. (2001) categorized amenities into land, 
recreational infrastructure, climate, water and winter and found all categories had a 
significant and positive correlation with employment growth. They surmised that the 
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positive impact of the land amenities may be due to tourism in areas with publicly owned 
land and mountainous areas. 
Role of Tourism 
This research investigates linkages between land conservation and tourism 
employment. If it is shown that land conservation can lead to economic growth in the 
form of tourism, then regional planners, the tourism industry, and policy makers may 
promote conservation as a contributor to economic development. Increased land 
protection on local scales could have global implications for biodiversity conservation 
(MacGillivray, 1993; Asafu-adjaye, 2003; Soule and Sanjayan, 1998). 
Tourism is one of the largest economic sectors in the world, employing millions 
of people and supporting small businesses in some of the most rural regions (World 
Travel and Tourism Council, 2002). Nature-based tourism, defined as traveling to see the 
natural areas of a region, is one of the fastest growing tourism markets (Wells, 1997). 
Nature based tourism has the potential to provide economic incentives for and thus 
contribute to biodiversity conservation (Wells, 1997). Marcouiller (1998) identifies the 
role of environmental resources as a primary input in tourism's production function. 
Public lands function as a public good, providing this input to tourism at no cost to firms. 
The recreational values of natural ecosystems are not set in a market, and thus harder to 
measure than tradable goods such as timber (Marcouiller, 1998). 
Conservation groups often use the economic gains of tourism as justification for 
setting aside more public lands and closing off existing lands to extractive activities 
(Buckley, 1999). However, more benefit could be gained if tourism firms joined with 
7 
these groups as well as government agencies to push for more conservation lands 
(Buckley, 1999; Marcouiller, 1998). 
The role of the tourism industry in land conservation initiatives has been minor. 
Recognition and support from the tourism industry could have strong implications for 
land protection and biodiversity conservation. This research investigates the direct link 
between public conservation lands and tourism employment. We hypothesize that 
public conservation land has a positive and significant relationship with tourism 
employment. 
Methods 
Though not all of the landscapes protecting biodiversity are accessible or 
attractive to visitors, many public lands in the United States are available for recreation 
and serve to attract tourists. Conservation lands often enhance the scenic quality of an 
area which may also attract individuals who do not directly use these areas. Tourism 
firms often locate near public conservation lands to attract their visitors (Deller et al., 
2001; Marcouiller, 1998). We expect the areas near conservation lands to have abundant 
employment opportunities in tourism. 
This study conducts a county-level analysis of the effects of public conservation 
lands on tourism employment in the United States. Consider the following linear model, 
which specifies tourism employment as a function of conservation lands and other 
variables: 
(1) TEj = p0 + PiCLi + p2NAi + p3AQ + p4STs + £i 
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i = 1,....,3059, where p are vectors of unobserved parameters to be estimated and Ejis the 
error term assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean. 
The dependent variable, tourism employment (TE), is the percentage of a 
county's employed population that works in a tourism industry. Tourism as an industry is 
notoriously difficult to define (Marcouiller et al., 2004; English et al., 2000; Johnson and 
Thomas, 2001). This study uses the IMPLAN Resource Dependence Typology variables 
developed by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service 
(ERS). Data were collected from the National Outdoor Recreation Supply Information 
System (NORSIS), compiled in 1997 by the US Forest Service. We use the number of 
jobs in the following Resource Dependence (RD) categories: eating and drinking, hotels 
and accommodations, and tourism services. 
This categorization of the tourism industry is similar to other studies (Marcouiller 
et al. 2004; English et al., 2000; Johnson and Thomas, 2001) with some studies including 
retail services and transportation. Such a categorization is an imperfect measure of 
tourism, due to spending by residents and business travelers in these industries. 
However, employment data for these economic sectors are widely available, and methods 
to separate tourist expenditures in these sectors from spending by residents and business 
travelers are in their infancy and not available at the U. S. county level. 
Number of jobs in these three categories are added and divided by the total 
employed population to get a percentage employed in tourism. A percentage is desirable 
in this circumstance as United States counties vary tremendously in population and size. 
TE represents each county's dependence on tourism. See Figure 1 for the distribution of 
tourism employment across the United States. 
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Only public conservation lands were included in the Conservation Land (CL) 
independent variables, due to data availability. Public lands are an imperfect measure of 
biodiversity conservation for a few reasons. United States public lands are not optimally 
designed for biodiversity conservation (Grumbine, 1990). Conservation on private lands 
play an important and ever-increasing role, but data on land conserved by private 
landowners and private conservation groups are scattered and difficult to obtain 
(Merenlender, 2003). Public conservation land data are widely available at the county 
level, and thus serves as a proxy for biodiversity conservation in this study. 
CL is the proportion of total county acres that are in conservation status, due to 
the largely different sizes of United States counties. CL variables were obtained from 
NORSIS. Equation 1 will be estimated in three separate regressions using three different 
categories of conservation land, similarly to Lewis et al. (2002) which looked at the 
effects of preservationist and multiple-use lands together and separately. A priori, all 
conservation lands are expected to have a positive, significant relationship with tourism 
employment. 
The first category, General Public lands (GP), includes federal, state, county and 
municipal lands. This classification is broad, including lands of unknown management 
status at the state, county and municipal level. Federal lands include lands owned by: 
National Forest Service (USDAFS), US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), US Army 
Corps of Engineers (COE), Bureau of Reclamation, National Park Service (NPS), and 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Lands owned by the U.S. military are not included 
in this analysis. Many of these lands include some resource extractive activities such as 
logging and ranching. This most inclusive category represents public lands protected 
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Figure 1. Tourism Employment 
Figure 2. General Public Lands 
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Figure 3. Recreational Lands 
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Figure 4. Wilderness Area 
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from development, though not necessarily from some economic activities. See Figure 2 
for the distribution of General Public Lands. 
Some of the lands known to be managed for recreation are represented in the 
variable, recreation (REC). Though not all lands that allow recreation are included, the 
land that is included is known to have recreation and public access as central to their 
management. See Figure 3 for a distribution of Recreational lands. Wilderness is a 
variable that includes lands in the National Wilderness Preservation System (NWPS). 
Such areas are road-less and off-limits to motorized activities. Often wilderness areas are 
nested within other multiple-use lands such as National Forests. See Figure 4 for a 
distribution of wilderness areas. 
See Table 1 for a description of variables. 
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Variable 
Tourism 
Employment 
(TE) 
General 
Public Land 
(GP) 
Recreational 
Land (REC) 
Wilderness 
Area 
(WILD) 
Coast 
Water 
January sun 
July temp 
July humid 
Plains 
Tablelands 
Plains/Hills 
Open hills 
and 
mountains 
Hills and 
Mountains 
Pop density 
P/MSA 
Airport 
Interstate 
State 
Table 1. The Variables 
Description 
% of employed population in lodging, 
eating/drinking and tourism services 
% acres in federal, state, county, and 
municipal ownership, including; Bureau of 
Reclamation, National Park Service, Army 
Corps of Engineers, USDA Forest Service, US 
Fish & Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land 
Management, Natural Resources Inventory 
(County, Municipal and State owned land) 
% acres in National Park Service, State Parks, 
and USFish and Wildlife recreational lands 
% acres in National Wilderness Preservation 
System 
Dummy (1 = coastal county, 0 = no) 
% water area 
Mean hours of January sunlight 
Mean July temperature 
Mean July relative humidity 
Dummy (1 = topography is plains, 0= no) 
Dummy (1 = topography is tablelands, 0= no) 
Dummy (1 = topography is plains with hills, 0 
= no) 
Dummy (1 = topography is open hills and 
mountains, 0 = no) 
Dummy (1 = topography is hills and 
mountains, 0 = no) 
Population density in persons per square mile 
Distance to the nearest Metropolitan 
Statistical Area or Primary Metropolitan 
Statistical Area, in Kilometers 
Dummy (1 = county contains an airport with a 
minimum of 100,000 enplanement per year, 0 
= no) 
Dummy (1 = interstate highway intersects 
county border, 0 = no) 
Dummy for each State (ex. 1 = Vermont 0 = 
no) 
Mean 
8.1 
13.42 
0.239 
0.141 
197.8 
43.65 
0.062 
0.438 
NA 
Standard 
Deviation 
6.96 
19.36 
1.5 6.14 
.78 4.17 
.10 0.30 
4.56 11.22 
151.49 33.27 
75.84 5.36 
56.02 14.62 
0.484 0.5 
0.064 0.25 
0.072 0.26 
0.43 
0.35 
1412 
53.27 
0.242 
0.496 
NA 
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Several natural amenities (NA) are expected to be positively associated with 
tourism employment. These data were gathered from McGranahan (1999). These are 
considered desirable amenities that positively influence recreation, retirement decisions, 
and other types of migration decisions (Marcouiller et al. 2004; Deller et al, 2001; 
McGranahan, 1999). These amenities include: water (lakes and rivers), coastline, varied 
topography (ie. mountains), and climate considered pleasant (sunny winters, temperate 
summers). See Table 1 for NA variable descriptions (the variables coast, water, January 
sun, July humid, July temp, and the five topography codes are considered part of NA). 
While conservation lands and amenities are local characteristics that are desirable 
to tourists, it is also important to control for the potential source of tourists in the region 
and the ease of access. Urban areas may serve as a source of tourist visitors to 
conservation lands in more rural areas. Population density (Pop density) and distance to 
the nearest Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area or Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(P/MSA) were included to capture effects of population on tourism employment and 
employment in general. Accessibility is also a factor in determining the tourism in an 
area. Larger airports (Airport) and interstate highways (Interstate) are hypothesized to be 
positively associated with tourism employment. The variables of Pop density, P/MSA, 
Airport and Interstate are seen as indicators of accessibility (AC). 
Variations may exist among states that influence a county's tourism. These could 
include a state's marketing efforts for tourists, meals and lodging taxes, or the image and 
allure of the state to outsiders. These unmeasured variables are controlled for by the 
inclusion of state level dummy variables (ST). 
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The following models were estimated for our 3 categorizations of CL: 
(2) TE, = p0 + PiGPi + p2NAi + p3AC, + p4STi + £j 
(3) TEj = p0 + PiRECj + p2NAj + p3ACj + p4STi + 8j 
(4) TEj = p0 + piWILDj + p2NA, + p3ACi + p4STj + Si 
Equations 2-4 are used to examine the effects of conservation lands on tourism 
employment. The possibility exists that conservation lands in one county may affect 
tourism employment in adjacent counties (a potential for spatial autocorrelation). Often 
there are "gateway communities" that serve visitors to parks that may be located in 
separate counties. Other natural amenities such as climate and topography exhibit 
clustering in space (Kwang-Koo et al., 2005). Many natural amenity variables are 
included in these models, however, there may be omitted variables that are spatially 
correlated. These concerns led to a consideration of the possibility of spatial dependence. 
Diagnostic tests for spatial autocorrelation of the residuals were performed on 
Equations 2-4. When ordinary least squares (OLS) is used on a model with spatially 
correlated residuals, inefficient parameter estimates may result, and standard errors may 
be underestimated. Mapping of residuals indicated a possibility for spatial 
autocorrelation. Moran's I values for all three models (equations 2-4) were positive and 
significant, indicating spatial dependence. Lagrange Multiplier test statistics indicated 
that a spatial error model (SEM) was an appropriate alternative model. Multiple spatial 
weight matrices were tested in the above mentioned tests. A first-order Queen contiguity 
spatial weight matrix was chosen as most appropriate, which defines counties as 
neighbors if they share common boundaries or vertices. 
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Once the SEM was chosen, equations 2-4 were estimated with the following error 
term: 
n 
(5) & = pYs Wij^ + jUi 
7=1 
where s is a (nxl) vector of spatially correlated error terms, p. is a vector (nxl) of 
uncorrelated error terms, and p is a (nxl) of the spatially correlated coefficient to be 
estimated. W is a nxn spatial weights matrix (wy) that defines a set of neighbors for each 
observation. Since a first order queen contiguity matrix was chosen, county j is assigned 
a 1 when county j is defined as a neighbor to county i, (ie. it shares a boundry or vertex 
with county i) and zero otherwise. The diagonal elements of the matrix are zero (wii=0) 
as a county is not a neighbor to itself. 
Log likelihood, Akaike info, and Schwarz criterion, all goodness of fit measures, 
were used to compare OLS with SEM models for equations 2-4. All three goodness of fit 
measures showed improvements from OLS to SEM models for all three equations. 
Therefore, a SEM was chosen as the most appropriate model. 
Results 
Table 2 shows SEM regression results for equations 2-4. The coast and water 
variables performed as expected, both having a positive and significant relationship with 
tourism employment in all three models. Of the topography categories, only hills and 
mountains had a significant effect, which turned out to be positive as expected. Mean 
sun in January does not have a significant relationship with tourism employment, while 
19 
Table 2. Spatial Error Model Results on 3 Types of Conservation Lands 
Variable Estimated Coefficients 
Constant 47.522*** 55.65*** 48.956*** 
(11.52) (13.221) (12.137) 
General Public Land 0.089*** 
(10.63) 
NA NA 
Recreation Land NA 0.137*** 
(7.103) 
NA 
Wilderness NA NA 0.38*** 
(13.218) 
Coast 1.165** 1.074* 1.432** 
(1.965) (1.762) (2.448) 
Water 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.089*** 
(7.04) (6.51) (7.365) 
Tablelands -0.074 -0.232 -0.07 
(-0.149) (-0.456) (-0.142) 
Plains and Hills -1.119** -0.761 -0.6 
(-2.211) (-1.472) (-1.205) 
Open Hills/Mountains 0.173 0.147 0.178 
(-0.512) (0.423) (0.54) 
Hills and Mountains 1.450*** 2 377*** 1.686*** 
(3.074) (4.987) (3.687) 
January Sun -0.008 -0.012 -0.011 
(-1.049) (-1.395) (-1.439) 
July Temp -0.457*** -0.547*** -0.466*** 
(-9.762) (-11.493) (-10.151) 
July Humidity -0.131*** -0.146*** -0.131*** 
(-5.835) (-6.309) (-5.956) 
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Table 2. Continued 
P/MSA 0.004 0.008** 0.007** 
(1.399) (2.552) (2.552) 
Pop Density 0.00009 0.00003 -0.00003 
(-1.084) (-0.317) (-0.308) 
Interstate 1.554*** 1.605*** 1.612*** 
(6.588) (6.699) (6.908) 
Airport 2.87*** 2.821*** 2.645*** 
(6.386) (6.227) (5.932) 
Rho 0.141*** 0.191*** 0.127*** 
(4.802) (6.66) (4.304) 
Log likelihood -9706.78 -9735.53 -9678.32 
Number of Observations 3058 
Dummy variables included for each state. 
Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels. 
July temperature and humidity both had significant negative relationships. For example, 
the first regression result shows a coefficient of -0.46 for July temp. Thus, a one degree 
increase in July temp from its mean of 75.8 to 76.8, is associated with a decrease of 
percentage of employment in tourism of about one-half a percentage point. Results on 
natural amenity variables, as expected, show that areas with pleasant summer weather, 
coastline, lakes and rivers, and mountainous terrain, are more likely to have tourism as an 
important aspect of their economy. 
Population density proved insignificant in all 3 models, while distance to the 
nearest PMSA or MSA was significant and positive. This distance is measured in 
kilometers, so though the coefficients seem small, this can be expected as they represent 
the association of a one kilometer increase with a change in the proportion of tourism 
employment. The presences of a sizable airport and an interstate highway, representing 
accessibility to tourists, proved positive and significant. Rho is our spatially 
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autoregressive coefficient, and is positive and highly significant in all three models. Rho 
is showing positive correlation of residuals across 
space, and the spatial error model appears to be controlling for omitted variables that are 
clustered in space. Possibilities include natural amenities not included in the models that 
are naturally clustered in space. It is also possible rho is controlling for conservation 
lands in one county influencing surrounding counties' tourism employment. 
The independent variable of most interest in this study—conservation land 
(CL)—was positive and significant in all 3 classifications. All three measures—-General 
Public, Recreational, and Wilderness, were positive and significant as expected, but with 
different coefficients. General Public Land, the most inclusive category, has a coefficient 
of 0.089. This can be translated to mean that a 1 percentage point increase in General 
Public Land (from its mean of 13.4% to 14.4%) is associated with an increase of tourism 
employment of approximately 0.09 percentage point. Recreational lands had a 
coefficient of 0.137, indicating that an increase in recreational lands of 1 percentage point 
(from its mean of 1.5% to 2.5%) could lead to an increase of tourism employment of 
approximately 0.14 percentage point. Wilderness has a coefficient of 0.38, which means 
that an increase of 1 percentage point (from its very low mean of 0.78% to 1.78%) is 
associated with an increase of tourism employment of approximately 0.38 percentage 
point. 
The three classifications of CL—General public lands, recreation lands and 
wilderness—have means of 13.4%, 1.5%, and 0.78% respectively. Care must be taken in 
comparing the coefficients across these three classifications. Adding one percentage 
point to 13.4%—the mean of General public land—to get 14.4%, only leads to a 7.46% 
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increase in the amount of general public land. Recreational lands would increase from 
1.5% to 2.5%, a 66.7% increase in recreational lands. Adding one percentage point to 
wilderness, from 0.78% to 1.78%, would be a 128.2% increase in wilderness land from 
its previous level. Wilderness may have the highest coefficient of all three types of lands 
(0.38) due to its relative scarcity, and that adding 1 percentage point more than doubles 
its percentage. 
Another way of illustrating the differences is through the concept of elasticity. 
Elasticity is a way of measuring the responsiveness of one variable to a change in 
another. Table 3 shows elasticity calculations for the three conservation land variables. 
These calculations look at the percent change in tourism employment (its change is 
divided by its mean) divided by the percent change in conservation land (its change is 
divided by its mean). 
Table 3. Elasticity 
GenPub Recreation Wilderness 
% change TE 0.089/8.1 = 1.1% 0.137/8.1 = 1.69% 0.38/8.1= 4.69 % 
% chance CL 1/13.4 = 7.46% 1/1.5 = 66.7% 1/0.78 = 128.2% 
Elasticitv=%ATE 
%ACL 
1.1/7.46 = 0.147 1.69/66.7 = 0.025 4.69/128.2 = 0.037 
General public land yields the highest elasticity—the percentage change in tourism 
employment is highest in comparison to the percentage change in conservation land. 
Recreation land yields the lowest elasticity. 
However, a policy maker trying to increase the role of tourism in the economy 
might want to simply look at the coefficient rather than the elasticity figure. In a 
hypothetical county with a total of 1000 acres, 1 percentage point of its land is 10 acres. 
Increasing conservation land by 1 percentage point is always 10 acres whether you start 
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from a mean of 13.4%, 1.5%, or 0.78%. If allocating land to general public uses, 
primarily recreational uses, or wilderness area cost the same (a simplifying assumption), 
then a policy maker would want to add to wilderness area to get the most increase in 
tourism employment. Adding wilderness area may not be possible, as natural areas 
without roads and development are few and far between in many parts of the United 
States (which may be, as speculated above, the reason for its high value). Designating 
relatively natural areas as parks for recreation may be the next best alternative. A policy 
maker must also consider the local conditions rather than simply thinking in terms of 
percentage points. Considering the distribution of the costs and benefits of new 
conservation land will be critical to its success. 
Conclusion 
There are limitations in this study's ability to assess the impact of land 
conservation on tourism. Landscapes and economies are dynamic, and this study's use of 
static data makes it difficult to assess a cause and effect relationship between tourism and 
conservation. In addition, data availability dictated that only public lands were assessed. 
Land protection has been changing over the last several years, with private parties taking 
an ever increasing role. Many private partnerships between landowners and land trusts or 
other conservation organization are protecting landscapes through the use of conservation 
easements as well as fee ownership (Land Trust Alliance, 2005). However, data on these 
new land transactions are scattered and difficult to obtain (Merenlender, 2003). Lands 
conserved privately have to possibility to impact tourism, however, we are unable to 
assess that impact quantitatively at this time. 
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In assessing the correlation of public lands with tourism employment, it must also 
be noted that all public lands do not adequately protect biodiversity (Grumbine, 1990). 
Public lands are an imperfect representation of biodiversity conservation, however, 
formal land protection has been used as an indicator of biodiversity conservation in other 
studies (Asafu-adjaye, 2003; MacGillivray, 1993). In addition, certain lands that are 
designated for the protection of particularly sensitive species or ecosystem may not be 
attractive to tourists or appropriate for tourism and recreation. Outdoor recreation and 
tourism development have been identified as a threat to biodiversity in their own right 
(Czech et al., 2000) however, the impacts of tourism are minimal when compared to 
large-scale landscape conversion (Buckley, 2000). New initiatives in ecotourism show 
promise to minimize tourism's impact and increase its ability to contribute to the local 
economy and engender community support for protected areas. Ecotourism has the most 
potential when conservation interests are part of its planning and design as well as 
governments and the tourism industry (Giannecchini, 1993; Ceballos-Lascurain, 2001). 
This research does point to a relationship between public conservation lands and 
importance of tourism in the local economy. Regional planners may be interested in this 
result when planning a community's economic development strategy. The tourism 
industry will likely be interested in public land designation as a way to encourage tourism 
growth. Conservation groups may use growth in tourism as an economic justification of 
designating new conservation lands. While these groups often differ in goals and 
strategies, there is potential for greater partnership between tourism industry 
representatives, local governments, and conservation organizations, who may have more 
mutual interests than they once realized. 
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Chapter 3 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS APPLIED TO UNITED STATES PRIVATE LAND 
CONSERVATION 
Introduction 
Land conservation in the United States, once thought to be an activity primarily 
undertaken by public agencies, has taken a new direction recently. There is a new wave 
of increasing private land conservation challenging the notion that only the government 
can protect the environment. Concurrently, conservation biologists and ecosystem 
managers are recognizing that public lands alone cannot stem the loss of biodiversity and 
that private lands must be included in conservation planning (Merenlender, 2004; Jenkins 
et al, 2004; Margules and Pressey, 2000). Activity by land trusts and other private 
organizations has increased dramatically over the last couple of decades, both in the 
number of land trusts and the amount of land protected (Land Trust Alliance, 2005; 
Morrisette, 2001). As of 2005, 37 million acres have been conserved by land trusts and 
other private organizations in the United States, up 54 percent from 2000 (Land Trust 
Alliance, 2005). More specifically, acres protected by conservation easements by state 
and local land trusts (as opposed to all private conservation organizations) increased by 
148 percent from 2000 to 2005 (Land Trust Alliance, 2005). A conservation easement is 
a non-possessory interest in the land, in which the original owner retains the title to the 
land, but certain property rights (usually types of development rights) are transferred to a 
private organization or government entity (Morrissette, 2001; Gustanski, 2000). Rapid 
growth in the use of conservation easements is transforming the way land is protected, 
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focusing efforts on voluntary actions of private landowners in concert with land trusts 
and other conservation organizations. 
Interdisciplinary effort can be used to assess the impact of land trusts and 
conservation easements on biodiversity conservation, provision of ecological goods and 
services, and community economic well-being (Merenlender et al. 2004). Understanding 
institutional and organizational factors that have contributed to this surge in private land 
conservation are an important step towards this goal. New institutional economics, and 
particularly the work of Douglass North (1990), can be applied as a framework for 
viewing: the recent surge in private land conservation, the formation of new land trusts 
and the shifting focus of existing organizations, and the development of conservation 
easements as a tool for formally protecting landscapes. This framework shows how 
institutions and organizations respond to one another in a continuous feedback cycle, 
leading to a dynamic system of institutional change. This study applies North's 
framework to help explain the recent surge in private land conservation. 
Institutional Analysis 
Acheson (1994) and Coase (1998) describe a "new" institutional economics 
which explains the formation of institutions, drawing from the fields of political science, 
anthropology, and sociology. The new institutional economics explains how a society's 
institutions, such as its constitution, legal system, and cultural norms, affect and are 
influenced by economic activity (Coase, 1998). Institutional economists describe 
institutions as the "rules of the game" created by individuals and groups that are aware of 
how the institutional framework in which they live and work greatly influences their 
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choices and outcomes. Institutions are often formal or legal rules that can be definitively 
enforced, but they can also be informal constraints that are socially enforced. Institutions 
serve to constrain people's choices and thus can make the actions of others more 
predictable, reduce transactions costs, and help economic actors make choices with more 
certainty (North, 1990, p. 6, 27). 
Economic models of perfect competition make a number of assumptions 
regarding the decision-making of individuals, including that they have perfect 
information and zero transaction costs. Coase (1960), Acheson (1994) and North (1990) 
among others have pointed out that these assumptions often do not apply in practice. In 
cases of market failure, when private markets do not lead to an efficient outcome and 
individual decision making does not lead to socially optimal conditions, institutions 
become an important part of economic activity. Because institutions make the actions of 
others more predictable, they can lower the costs of exchange (Acheson, 1994; Bates, 
1994). 
Property rights are a key institution to economic activity. Property rights are a 
bundle of rights over a resource, determined and assigned by political process (Acheson, 
1994). Property rights are almost never fully assigned—some rights are typically retained 
by the government and/or community (North, 1990, p.33). In large, impersonal 
economies, where exchange is often colored by imperfect information and transaction 
costs, state enforcement of property rights contracts is essential to their existance (North, 
1990, p.57). Development of property rights will have distributional consequences 
(Baland and Platteau, 1998), favoring some individuals and groups over others, and 
change to existing property rights systems are often contentious (Acheson, 1994). 
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Property rights have been lumped into four major categories (see Berkes et al., 
1989). "Open access" is the absence of well-defined property rights, in which no one is 
excluded from use. Ocean fisheries through much of history have operated this way. 
"Common property" is when a defined group of users can use the property and exclude 
others. Ground water is a resource typically controlled in this way. "State property" is a 
situation in which the government owns the resource and controls access and usage, such 
as public park lands open for recreation. "Private property" exists where an individual or 
organization controls a resource and can exclude others, which exists over much farm and 
forest land in the Eastern United States. 
Property rights and other institutions shape incentives society members face, and 
can define the context in which individuals and organizations undertake certain activities 
(North, 1990, p. 4). Douglass North has developed a framework for understanding 
institutional formation and change. Organizations, or groups of people bounded by a 
common purpose, arise in the context of institutional frameworks. Institutions are the 
rules of the game, and organizations are the players (North, 1990, p.4-5). Institutions 
determine the pay-offs of certain activities and influence the types of organizations that 
form and the accomplishments that are possible to these groups (North, 1993). 
Organizations can in turn influence institutions, and change them to better suit the 
organization's purposes. 
North (1990, p.86-7) describes the following factors involved in institutional 
change. Exogenous changes in relative prices lead parties to try to renegotiate contracts 
to better take advantage of these new prices. However, they may find that they cannot 
change contracts due to existing rules. So they may either react by investing in new skills 
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and resources to take advantage of new opportunities provided by the change, or invest 
resources into changing the rules so that new contracts can be made. Competition 
between organizations can also be an agent of institutional change, inducing 
organizations to invest in new knowledge and skills. So not only do institutional 
frameworks determine what types of organizations will form, they also help dictate what 
skills and knowledge organizations will need to succeed. Organizations in turn may use 
their resources to work for institutional change. See Figure 5 for a diagram based on 
North's framework of institutional change. Arrows represent influence that one factor 
exerts on the formation of another. For instance, transactions costs may encourage the 
formation of property rights, and organizations such as firms may encourage changes in 
the institutions (rules). 
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Figure 5. Representation of North's Framework of Institutional Change 
Market failure 
(transactions costs, public goods, etc.) 
Institutions 
(common law, property rights, 
etc.) 
React to 
exogenous 
changes by 
pushing for 
institutional 
change 
Organizations 
(firms, 
cooperatives,etc.) 
Provide 
context and 
incentive 
structure that 
encourages: 
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Market Failure in Conservation Land Provision 
Before launching into a description of the institutional and organizational aspects of 
private land conservation, a look at the market failures associated with land conservation 
is illustrative. Many benefits supplied by conservation land are public goods, and 
recognizing the market failures associated with public goods is helpful in overcoming 
barriers to their provision. Market failures will lead to an under provision of public 
goods, as individual decision makers will not account for benefits others receive in their 
choices. 
Goods can be seen on a spectrum from public to private. Four major types of goods 
are explained by Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) and their classification and some examples 
are shown in Figure 6. The place that a good occupies on this spectrum has implications 
for the type of organization best suited to provide that good. Private goods will most 
optimally be provided by firms in market settings, due to the ability to charge money and 
exclude those who do not pay. The pure public good (ie. weather forecasts) will benefit 
everyone, and the enjoyment by one does not detract from the enjoyment of another. The 
presence of a public good will lead rational individuals to "free-ride" or enjoy the benefit 
with out paying. Individuals receive the benefit with or with out paying, and free-riders 
will opt out of paying (Bates, 1994). Governments, which possess the ability to coerce 
people to pay through the use of taxes, have typically been the major providers of public 
goods. However, it is now being recognized that private organizations with strong 
leaders that can use selected incentives and/or sanctions can be public good providers 
(Bates, 1994). Certain groups stand to benefit from institutional change and provision of 
public goods and can organize and influence others to contribute leading to "collective 
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action" solutions (Paavola and Adger, 2005). These collective action groups often take 
the form of associations which provide benefits to people that join (Acheson, 1994). 
There are an increasing number of creative types of public-private partnerships in public 
goods provision (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977). 
Figure 6. Types of Goods 
(from Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977, p. 78, Fig 3.1) 
Jointnevs of Use or Consumption 
Alternative Use Joint Use 
Feasible 
Exclusion 
Private good: bread, 
shoes, automobiles, 
haircuts, books, etc. 
Toll good: Theatre. 
night club, telephone 
service, toll road, cable 
TV, electric power 
Infeasible 
Exclusion 
Common pool resource: 
water pumped from a 
ground water basin, fish 
taken from an ocean, 
crude oil extracted from 
an oil field 
Public good: peace and 
security, national 
defense, mosquito 
abatement, fire 
protection, weather 
forecasts, "public'' TV" 
Common pool resources (ie. water pumped from a ground water basin) are those 
that are used by a collection of individuals in which they are all removing flow resources 
for their own private gain, but a stock of resources is in theory maintained for the 
continuation of use. Difficulty of exclusion can make common pool resources subject to 
over-exploitation and degradation, although new research indicates that many 
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communities overcome these problems with local based rules and organizations (Ostrom, 
1990). 
Many aspects of conservation lands have been described as public goods. 
Biodiversity conservation can be seen as a "pure" public good, whose benefits accrue 
globally, but costs are borne locally, making the incentive to supply even less than other 
public goods (Asafu-adjaye, 2003; Pearce and Moran, 1994, p. 43). Pearce and Moran, 
(1994, p. 83-115) give an overview of methods of evaluating benefits of sustainable uses 
of biodiversity, including indirect use and non-use values as well as conventional direct 
uses such as forest products, agriculture and tourism. They use this framework to suggest 
ways governments or NGO's may alter incentives facing private landowners in their 
decision-making to account for the benefits of biodiversity conservation (Pearce and 
Moran, 1994). 
Another good associated with some conservation lands is tourism and recreational 
access. Vail and Hultkrantz (2000) describe recreational access as an "impure public 
good" and describe the situation in Maine one where landowners have limited ability to 
exclude tourists due to incompletely defined property rights, and tourists can use land 
jointly, but impose costs on other users in the form of congestion. Maine has an informal 
open land tradition, supported in part by state laws, that encourage recreationalists to 
view private land as a common pool resource (Acheson, 2006). This traditional access is 
under threat, as tourism demand increases and landowners are seeing tourists as imposing 
higher costs on them. Conservation easements by land trusts have increased significantly 
in recent years to help encourage landowners to keep their lands open to the public for 
recreation (Acheson, 2006). 
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Other examples of public goods from conservation lands include watershed 
protection, scenic landscapes, open space, carbon sequestration and climate stabilization. 
Many aspects of conservation land contain a mix of goods with public and private 
aspects. For instance, conservation lands that allow forestry with sustainable certification 
involve production of private goods (forest products), and some public benefits in the 
form of wildlife habitat, community economic benefits of forestry, and scenic quality. 
Economic benefits derived from tourism on conservation lands may be realized by a 
community. A community that effectively balances forestry with amenity and 
recreational values may have greater economic growth and stability than areas that rely 
chiefly on timber production (Bowe and Marcouiller, 2004). Economic growth and 
stability have some of the attributes of public goods, such as infeasibility of exclusion. 
The public goods nature of many aspects of conservation lands can be considered 
the market failures that have made government institutions such as public land ownership 
the primary methods of conservation land provision. 
Private Land Conservation 
Many non-governmental organizations have been able to overcome barriers to 
public goods provision and become major players in land conservation. Looking at 
changing circumstances and relative prices, and institutional change, can illustrate how 
private land conservation has grown as much as it has. 
Land conservation in the United States has historically relied heavily on public 
agencies designating lands as parks or reserves, or enacting regulations that restrict the 
rights of private landowners (Merenlender et al., 2004). Public conservation lands result 
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in a state property rather than a private property situation. Some criticism of public 
ownership is that it removes the land base from the tax roles, decreasing the revenue to 
the local community and in some cases alienates the local community (Merenlender et 
al., 2004). Increasing land prices in some parts of the U. S. increase the cost of public 
ownership (Ando et al. 1998). 
Government regulation (a separate method from land ownership of conserving 
ecosystems and species) can restrict development of private landowners around areas 
such as habitat of endangered species, shorelines, or wetlands. In this way, the state has 
been an effective provider of the public good (Morrisette, 2001). These regulations have 
often been very contentious as such institutional change takes away some property rights 
previously available to private land owners, who have a vested interest in organizing to 
oppose the rule change. Both government acquisition and regulation have been widely 
used in United States land conservation history, and can be credited with much success, 
but are increasingly coming under attack due to high costs and threats to private property 
rights (Merenlender et al., 2004). 
The belief that environmental protection can only be provided by public action is 
widespread, and many feel there is an inherent tension between the actions of individuals 
and the public good (Morrisette, 2001). Much of the literature on institutions and 
common pool resources indicates that there are many circumstances in which private 
actors coordinate their efforts to protect the environment and common pool resources 
(Morrisette, 2001; Ostrom, 1990). In this manner, collective action can overcome 
barriers to public goods provision, and non-governmental organizations and individuals 
can be effective providers of environmental public goods. 
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Many trends indicate the future of land conservation efforts will be played out 
increasingly on private lands (Morrisette, 2001; Land Trust Alliance, 2005; Merenlender 
et al., 2004). Land conservation by private organizations has seen a dramatic increase in 
recent years, taking an unprecedented and ever increasing role (Land Trust Alliance, 
2005). Land trusts and other related conservation organizations are growing in number, 
size and stature. The Land Trust Alliance defines a land trust as a "non-profit 
organization that, as all or part of its mission, actively works to conserve land by 
undertaking or assisting in land or conservation easement acquisition, or by its 
stewardship of such land or easements" (Land Trust Alliance, 2005). Figure 7 shows the 
growth in the number of land trusts from 1950 to the present. 
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Figure 7. Growth in the Number of Land Trusts (1950-2005) 
(From Land Trust Alliance, 2005) 
Conservation easements are the fastest growing private conservation technique 
employed by private agents. As of 2005, 6,245,969 acres have been protected by state 
and local land trusts with easements, up 148% from 2000 (Land Trust Alliance, 2005). 
See Figure 8 for trends in land conservation. Note that this figure includes land protected 
by state and local land trusts only, therefore covers a small percentage of total 
conservation easements. When land protected by national conservation organizations is 
included, LTA estimates the total acreage protected by private means (easements and 
other methods combined) as 37 million in 2005, up 54 percent from 2000 (Land Trust 
Alliance, 2005). The Nature Conservancy (TNC), a non-profit organization whose 
mission is to protect biodiversity has been using conservation easements since 1961. 
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Figure 8. Private Land Conservation by Local and State Land Trusts 
"5 
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Private Land Conservation by Local and State Land Trusts 
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•Acres Owned 
(From Land Trust Alliance, 2005) 
However, growth in TNC's use of conservation easements has increased from 
645,000 acres in 1997 to more than 2 million by 2003 (The Nature Conservancy, 2003). 
North's Framework and Private Conservation Growth 
North's framework is applied to the increase in United States private land 
conservation in Figure 9. Details of the institutional and organizational changes 
illustrated briefly in Figure 9 will be explained in detail below. 
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Figure 9. North's Framework and Private Land Conservation 
5. Institutions: 
2031(c) of Taxpayer Relief 
Act (1997), influenced by 
conservation organizations 
3. Institutions: 
Many states pass statutes 
to allow conservation 
easements 
1. Institutions: 
private property, 
tax code section 170(h) 
2. Organizations: 
Existing land trusts 
and conservation groups 
try out new tax code 
4. Organizations: 
New land trusts form, 
old conservation groups 
invest in new skills 
6. Organizations: 
Continue to grow in number and 
use of conservation easements, 
invest resources in influencing 
new tax legislation 
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A change in the IRS tax code in 1976 has been identified to be largely responsible 
for the surge in private land conservation (Small, 2000). The Tax Reform Act of 1976 
allowed easement donations of conservation or historical nature to be deducted from an 
individual's income tax as a charitable donation. A conservation easement is a non-
possessory interest in the land, in which the original owner retains the title to the land, but 
certain property rights (usually types of development rights) are transferred to a private 
organization or government entity (Morrissette, 2001; Gustanski, 2000). This easement 
provision in the 1976 Tax Reform Act passed Congress with little debate, and little notice 
was taken until 1980, when the statute was amended and made permanent. In 1980 the 
US. House and Senate committees only reported that they expected to lose about $5 
million a year in income tax revenue (Small, 2000). This action is seen as stage 1 on 
Figure 9—the institutional change that tipped the balance leading to a series of changes. 
A few conservation interest groups, including The Nature Conservancy (TNC), 
Trust for Public Land (TPL), and American Farmland Trust (AFT), had become involved 
in the Congressional debates on the 1980 statute, and in 1983 when the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking on Section 170(h) (the easement provision) was released, there 
was some confusion among land trusts and other conservation groups as to how these 
easements would work (Small, 2000). However, some land trusts and landowners tried 
out this new tax incentive, and due to a series of favorable letter rulings from the IRS on 
170(h) and several positive court cases that upheld challenges to the easements, 
landowners and land trusts began gaining confidence in the legitimacy of this tax 
provision to help advance private land conservation (Small, 2000). In Figure 9, this is the 
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first organizational shift (stage 2) as organizations begin to respond to institutional 
change. 
To enact conservation easements in the most advantageous manner, a variety of 
state statutes had to be changed to eliminate common law impediments, to allow 
conservation easements to be described as real property interests, and to enable non-profit 
organizations to own easements. Users of conservation easements have considerable 
flexibility in drafting documents. A conservation easement document is specifically 
tailored to the priorities of the landowner and the organization owning the easement. In 
drafting an easement, organizations and individuals are negotiating new rules and 
dividing property rights of a particular piece of land, tying this new institutional 
arrangement with the land in perpetuity in most cases. Essentially it is dividing a bundle 
of property rights that were once entirely private, into a combination of private and state 
ownership (or private and communal ownership in the case of the easement held by a 
non-profit entity). The common law of most states did not allow negative easements 
(preventing the landowner from undertaking certain activities) to be held in gross 
(benefiting the public good, rather than simply an adjacent piece of property) 
(Morriesette, 2001). 
Since laws concerning land are based on state statutes and court cases (Marchetti 
and Cosgrove, 2000) more institutional change was necessary before the use of 
conservation easements could become widespread. A few states already had legislation 
that enabled conservation easements prior to 1976. Other states began to pass statutes 
eliminating some of their common law impediments to conservation easements as land 
trusts and landowners began trying them out and they started showing up in courtrooms 
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(Morrissette, 2001). State statutes vary a great deal in terminology, types of restrictions 
and other aspects. In 1981, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws created the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA). UCEA was designed as 
a model for states in enacting statutes, and many states used this, creating greater 
uniformity among state statutes. UCEA enables contracting parties to place restrictions 
and obligations on real property, allows them to become perpetual and therefore take 
advantage of the tax deduction, and enables non-profit organizations to hold easements 
(Gustanski, 2000). Most states using UCEA modified it to reflect their unique situations 
to some degree. Most states require the organizations that hold easements to have 
conservation as all part of their mission (Mayo, 2000) to prevent organizations forming 
simply to help landowners to secure tax breaks (Morrisette, 2001). 
Currently, 46 states have conservation easement statutes. Gustanski and Squires 
(2000) contains a detailed, state by state account of circumstances and changes that 
occurred to allow easement enabling statutes to pass. They also describe many case 
studies in which the entrepreneurial spirit of land trusts stretched and pulled the laws to 
conserve land in new and creative ways (Gustanski, 2000). State institutions in place 
were altered due to new federal tax incentives and the desire of land trusts, landowners, 
and the public at large to take advantage of them and ensure that state courts would 
uphold the conservation easements. Since laws concerning land are based on state 
statutes and court cases, states vary considerably in the way that they treat conservation 
easements. Each state has its own unique story about how existing legislation, political 
will, public attitudes, activism by conservation organizations, formation of new land 
trusts, and/or the simply the successful use of conservation easements contributed to 
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successful enactment of state statutes (Gustanski and Squires, 2000). Interactions 
between existing institutions, courts, conservation organizations, landowners, and the 
public contributed to institutional change to varying degrees across states, and variations 
in state statutes can be attributed to variations in these institutions, organizations, and 
other circumstances. Stages 3 and 4 of Figure 9 represent the interplay between changing 
state statutes and growing organizations. 
In 1997, under the Clinton administration, section 2031(c) was added to the tax 
code, allowing land under conservation easements to be subject to a reduction in the 
estate tax. This new tax incentive for conservation easements can be traced back to 
action by the Piedmont Environmental Council, whose advocacy helped to bring the 
American Farm and Ranch Protection Act to Congress (Small, 2000). Eventually a 
modified version became part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Certain restrictions 
are a part of this new estate tax provisions, the most noteworthy being that easements 
must be donated and perpetual (Small, 2000). This additional incentive is now often 
considered in the easement planning process, and land trusts are becoming familiar with 
this new tax incentive (Squires, 2000). See stage 5 of Figure 9. 
In addition to new land trusts forming, older land trusts and conservation 
organizations are investing in new skills and strategies. A browse through the "job 
opportunities" page of the Land Trust Alliance shows an increasing need for people with 
knowledge of real estate and tax law (Land Trust Alliance, 2007a). Organizations such 
as TNC, TPL, and AFT have been increasing their use of conservation easements to 
achieve their goals (The Nature Conservancy, 2003, Morrisette, 2001). The New 
England Forestry Foundation (NEFF), owners of a "working forest" conservation 
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easement of 762, 192 acres in Maine, provides an interesting example of organizational 
change. NEFF was established in 1944 to provide forest management services to New 
England landowners, and later added conservation and education to its mission. In 1994, 
it began to increase its land conservation activities (New England Forestry Foundation, 
2006a), and in 1999 announced the terms of this new "Pingree Forest Partnership 
Project" which included the largest conservation easement in the United States at the time 
(New England Forestry Foundation, 2006b). 
Networking and information sharing also seems to be a new focus for land trusts 
and conservation organizations. The Land Trust Alliance (LTA) in 1981 experienced 
rapid growth and success, thanks in part to section 170(h) of the tax code (Small, 2000). 
LTA provides trainings and conferences, information on policies and upcoming 
legislation, professional resources and information on tax laws, job posting from land 
trusts nationwide, and a 5-year census of land trusts (Land Trust Alliance, 2005). On a 
smaller scale, the Maine Land Trust Network (MLTN) was established in 1995 to serve 
as a hub of information and to build capacity among land conservation organizations 
working in the state (Maine Land Trust Network, 2007). 
Some of the larger, national organizations are working on pushing institutional 
change. TNC, one of the organizations involved in the original tax legislation becoming 
permanent in 1980, recently released a legislative proposal to Congress that encouraged 
changes in conservation easement laws that would strengthen them and help end abuses 
(The Nature Conservancy, 2005). LTA's website encourages land trusts to "Share Your 
Story" by sending stories of successful conservation easements that they will compile and 
send to Congress (Land Trust Alliance, 2007b). This is designed to encourage Congress 
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to make permanent a temporary expansion in conservation easement tax incentives 
introduced in 2006, that allows easement donators to deduct larger proportions of their 
income from taxes, and allows them a longer period of time to claim deductions. These 
are just a couple of examples of the ways organizations are pushing for institutional 
change, and investing in skills and knowledge to help them do so, represented as stage 6 
in Figure 9. This cycle shows potential to continue in a similar manner as organizations 
are currently weighing in on the above mentioned temporary tax incentive, and the 
growth in land trusts and conservation easements continues to grow. 
Conclusion 
Private land conservation is growing rapidly, resulting in many new partnerships 
between conservation groups and private landowners. It is perhaps too soon to conclude 
what the long term impact of the new private land conservation will be. A review of the 
literature reveals much excitement around the growth and success of land trusts and 
conservation easements. The flexibility permitted in designing easements has been 
described as a benefit, as conservation priorities can reflect needs of the local community 
and gain more support (Land Trust Alliance, 2005). "Niche diversification" of a land 
trust whose conservation goals (and therefore easements) are tailored to the local 
community can help the land trust gain support, donations, and to mitigate the "free-
rider" problem (Albers and Ando, 2003). However, there can be certain inefficiencies to 
having too many land trusts, as many benefits that could occur due to coordination are 
too costly, and each land trust may not account for all of the public benefits of its 
activities in its' decision making, leading to socially inefficient outcomes (Albers and 
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Ando, 2003). Data on land trusts and conservation easements is scattered and difficult to 
obtain, and the distribution of costs and benefits is widely unknown (Merenlender et al. 
2003). However, networking organizations, such as LTA and MLN appear to mitigate 
some of the challenges of coordination that come with the rise in land trust numbers. 
Some organizations fear that cases of abuse of conservation easements will 
weaken their credibility, and others fear that successors to land will challenge 
conservation easements in court. In 2003, the IRS the U.S. Senate Finance Committee 
conducted an inquiry into The Nature Conservancy and many of its conservation 
easement practices, uncovering some questionable land transactions (Stephens and 
Ottaway, 2003a). The IRS has also been subjecting select easements to greater scrutiny 
in an attempt to crack down on abuses (Stephens and Ottaway, 2004). TNC has been 
responsive to allegations of abuse by reforming some of its conservation easement 
practices (Stephens and Ottaway, 2003b), and in encouraging stronger tax laws to end 
abuses. 
In spite of instances of abuse, however, private conservation is increasing 
exponentially, and is expected to continue to grow. Private conservation is not a 
replacement for public land ownership, but often is seen as a complement to it. The new 
emphasis on eco-system management by conservation biologists and federal land 
managers increasingly emphasizes organizational change, economic considerations, and 
collaborative decision-making (Grumbine, 1997; Imperial, 1999, among others). 
Merenlender et al. (2004) stress the importance of understanding the diversity of 
conservation organizations, how private organizations work with government agencies, 
and what the most effective organizational arrangements are for land conservation in 
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various settings. This analysis explains how institutional factors have influenced the 
organizations that have recently given great force to private conservation. Understanding 
the institutional factors that give rise to private land conservation and the resulting 
institutional change will lend some insight to the ongoing pursuit of the most effective 
organizational arrangements for land conservation. 
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Chapter 4 
CONCLUSION 
Both public and private land conservation in the United States have been 
examined. An econometric analysis has uncovered an association between public lands 
and tourism employment. Results suggest more collaboration between the tourism 
industry and land management agencies and conservation groups may be appropriate. A 
qualitative analysis using new institutional economic theories has given insight into the 
surge in private land conservation. A greater understanding of the institutional factors 
that encourage different kinds of conservation organizations and influence the activities 
they undertake advances the multi-disciplinary work that is increasingly seen as 
necessary to the future of ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation. 
There is an increasing emphasis on ecosystem-based management in public land 
agencies and academic research. Emerging themes in ecosystem-based management 
include the need to view ecological problems in a political, social and economic context, 
and the importance of data from the social sciences in making management decisions 
(Grumbine, 1997). Transforming organizations, developing partnerships with public and 
private interests, and forming networks are also important to ecosystem management 
(Grumbine, 1997). Nonprofit organizations and private firms are increasingly becoming 
partners with government agencies in natural resource decisions, rather than advocates 
and opponents (Imperial, 1999). Keough and Blahna (2006) describe a set of case studies 
in which ecosystem management approaches have been successfully implemented, 
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largely due to the use of multi-disciplinary data and the integration of social, economic, 
and ecological goals. 
Ongoing experiments and research in ecosystem-based management will surely 
continue to refine knowledge, challenge assumptions, and test the limits of a multi-
disciplinary approach. This study contributes to this emerging effort to effectively 
integrate society's goals of conserving natural ecosystems and biodiversity with its desire 
to continue to develop economic well being. 
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Appendix A 
Group Logit Results 
In Essay I, a Spatial Error Model (SEM) was chosen due to: the use of county level data, 
similar studies that account for spatial autocorrelation, and testing that showed that a 
SEM was a good fit for the data. However, typically a logistic functional form is 
recommended for a dependent variable that is a proportion or fraction (Kennedy, 2003). 
A logistic form could not be used in conjunction with a SEM, but has been provided here 
for comparison. In a logistic model, estimates of the dependent variable will remain 
bounded between zero and one. A group logit model was used, in which the counties are 
considered the groups. Each county is weighted by its total number of employed 
workers. Results are presented here for three group logit models on three measures of 
conservation lands. Coefficients and marginal effects have been converted from 
proportion to percentage. Marginal effects can be compared with SEM coefficients, as 
they represent the effect on the dependent variable of a one unit increase in the 
independent variable. 
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Table Al. Group Logit Results for General Public Lands 
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Constant -108.07 
(-91.835) 
-8.582 
(-91.821) 
General Public Land 0.184 
(76.125) 
0.015 
(76.136) 
Coast -2.76 
(-21.387) 
-0.218 
(-21.454) 
Water 0.155 
(61.088) 
0.012 
(61.096) 
Tablelands 5.203 
(37.13) 
0.421 
(36.49) 
Plains and Hills -19.248 
(-115.52) 
-1.43 
(-123.844) 
Open Hills/Mountains 2.51 
(21.342) 
0.2 
(21.208) 
Hills and Mountains 6.188 
(41.64) 
0.5 
(40.934) 
January Sun -0.125 
(-59.702) 
-0.01 
(-59.708) 
July Temp -1.548 
(-114.247) 
-0.12 
(-114.274) 
July Humidity -0.204 
(-36.018) 
-0.016 
(-36.018) 
P/MSA 0.098 
(69.833) 
0.0078 
(69.838) 
Pop Density 0.00096 
(135.028) 
0.00008 
(135.125) 
Interstate 4.36 
(42.805) 
0.342 
(43.338) 
Airport 19.248 
(212.217) 
1.579 
(205.709) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.571 
All variables are significant at the 1% level. Values in parenthesis are t statistics. 
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Table A2. Group Logit Results for Recreational Lands 
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Constant -112.365 
(-94.74) 
-8.92 
(-94.72) 
Recreational Land 0.154 
(37.05) 
0.012 
(37.05) 
Coast -2.56 
(-19.81) 
-0.203 
(-19.86) 
Water 0.175 
(69) 
0.014 
(69.01) 
Tablelands 5.822 
(41.65) 
0.472 
(40.85) 
Plains and Hills -18.22 
(-109.78) 
-1.36 
(-117.25) 
Open Hills/Mountains 3.264 
(27.875) 
0.261 
(27.65) 
Hills and Mountains 8.46 
(58.33) 
0.688 
(56.99) 
January Sun -0.104 
(-50.01) 
-0.008 
(-50.02) 
July Temp -1.52 
(-111.25) 
-0.12 
(-111.28) 
July Humidity -19.611 
(-34.52) 
-0.016 
(-34.52) 
P/MSA 0.111 
(79.73) 
0.009 
(79.74) 
Pop Density 0.001 
(139.12) 
0.0001 
(139.21) 
Interstate 4.656 
(45.72) 
0.365 
(46.33) 
Airport 19.64 
(216.9) 
1.612 
(210.11) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.571 
All variables are significant at the 1% level. Values in parenthesis are t statistics. 
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Table A3. Group Logit Results for Wilderness Areas 
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Constant -119.75 
(-102.25) 
-9.51 
(-102.23) 
Wilderness Area 0.388 
(58.17) 
0.031 
(58.17) 
Coast -2.54 
(-19.67) 
-0.2 
(-19.72) 
Water 0.183 
(73.42) 
0.015 
(73.43) 
Tablelands 5.794 
(41.45) 
0.469 
(40.65) 
Plains and Hills -18.14 
(-109.45) 
-1.353 
(-116.86) 
Open Hills/Mountains 3.269 
(27.91) 
0.262 
(27.69) 
Hills and Mountains 7.47 
(50.98) 
0.606 
(49.94) 
January Sun -0.105 
(-50.68) 
-0.008 
(-50.68) 
July Temp -1.45 
(-107) 
-0.115 
(-107.02) 
July Humidity -0.16 
(-28.15) 
-0.013 
(-28.15) 
P/MSA 0.111 
(79.45) 
0.009 
(79.46) 
Pop Density 0.001 
(140.95) 
0.0001 
(141.05) 
Interstate 4.85 
(47.57) 
0.38 
(48.23) 
Airport 19.29 
(212.48) 
1.582 
(205.95) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.571 
All variables are significant at the 1 % level. Values in parenthesis are t statistics. 
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